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For organization theorists to focus on their self-centered 
academic interests while ignoring their environment is 
wrong. It is wrong because it deprives organization theory of 
an extrinsic reason to exist, wrong because the issues arising 
in the environment are both challenging and interesting, and 
wrong because organization theorists might actually have 
something to contribute to world affairs. 
William Starbuck (2003: 442) 
Introduction
A few years ago the distinguished organization theorist, William Starbuck, noted that 
having “lost its connection to world affairs, today organization theory lacks an exter-
nal mission. Yet organizations lie at the heart of major conflicts that are shaping the 
course of the 21st century, and in principle, organization theory could contribute sig-
nificantly to human welfare” (Starbuck 2003: 439). The connection that he found to 
world affairs was grounded in “the emotions of everyday life” and their connection to 
two themes that “characterized writings about organizations. The earliest organiza-
tional writings by sociologists and economists focused on the effects of governmental 
bureaucracies on societies” (Starbuck 2003: 439). He goes on to note that 
Following the Second World War, writers began to see bureaucracies outside the gov-
ernmental context and began complaining about ‘organizations’ rather than just bureauc-
racies. People had not complained about ‘organizations’ earlier because the word ‘organi-
zation’ did not acquire its current meaning until around 1930. By the late 1950s, com-
plaints about organizations had become widespread. One very influential book was 
Whyte’s (1956) best-selling critique of American corporate society, which asserted that a 
troubling ‘Social Ethic’ gripped America. Many employees, at all levels of management 
and in technical specialties, were allowing their employing organizations to dominate their 
lives and the lives of their families. Organizations were shaping employees’ personalities, 
were specifying employees’ dress and behavior, and were cutting off employees’ roots in 
communities by moving them and their families frequently. Another influential book was 
Argyris’s (1957) academic critique, which documented how organizations impede em-
ployees’ development and foster unhealthy personalities … As organization theory grew 
larger and gained respectability, it also became more autonomous from external con-
straints, more organized, and more fragmented. Academics gained freedom to focus on 
what interested themselves. Research methodology received progressively more respect, 
almost to the exclusion of validity or relevance. The most prevalent forms of empiricism 
became stylized types that encouraged observers to remain detached from the situations 
observed. Subtopics within organization theory proliferated and derived their popularity 
from their intellectual properties, and theories and methodologies evolved differently in 
different societies.  (Starbuck 2003: 440f.). 
While not dissenting from this account it is noteworthy that the Second World War 
merely serves as punctuation, as it does for other significant accounts of organization 
theories’ career. James March (2007), for instance, uses that war as an organizational
device for anchoring reflection on three generations of punctuated equilibrium in 
scholarship. The first generation of scholars are introduced thus: 
The Second World War changed things. The massive material, intellectual and economic 
devastation of Europe, including the decimation of the German, Austrian, Italian and 
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Eastern European scholarly communities, made the reconstruction of European scholarly 
strength a relatively slow process. Although there were significant European scholars 
working on studies of organizations earlier in the postwar period, it was not until well into 
the 1970s that European studies of organizations achieved a scale adequate to reassert it-
self as an important force.  
In contrast, economic recovery in North America was relatively fast and contributed to 
the postwar economic and political expansion of North American institutions. A signifi-
cant factor both in the recovery of North American scholarship and in the directions that 
recovery took was the extraordinary immigration of scholars to North America from 
Germany, Austria and the rest of Central Europe during the 1930s. These scholars, who 
were born as Jews in Central Europe and came to the United States to escape persecu-
tion, included some of the more distinguished subsequent contributors to North Ameri-
can academic concern about organizing … In many ways, the greatest single benefactor 
of North American social science and organization studies in the mid-20th century was 
Adolf Hitler (March 2007: 11f.). 
March goes on to discuss the characteristics of a scientific behavioral science in North 
America that formed this decisive first post-war generation of American, white, male 
and young scholars: “the conversion of economic theory into a workable mathematical 
form … the development of mathematical models in psychology, sociology, economics, 
geography, political science and anthropology … an extensive elaboration of techniques 
for the gathering and multivariate analysis of quantitative data in economics, psychology, 
political science and sociology” (March 2007: 12). In general, a professionalization pro-
ject based on the norms of the behavioural sciences was underway, given the widespread 
criticism of the low-level of business school education that had surfaced in two influen-
tial 1959 reports (see the discussion in Khurana 2007). Starbuck (2003: 442) sees this 
generation’s professionalization as responsible for an increasing lack of relevance of or-
ganization theory: “Immersed in their academic milieus, few organization theorists have 
focused on connections between organizations and social problems, although long-
standing social problems persist and new ones appear.” 
While the postwar era may have characterized the generation demographically the 
experience of bureaucracy as it connected with ‘social problems’ which the Second 
Word War generated did not seem especially to mark its members, with the possible ex-
ception of some notable contributions to the sociology of military organizations (Lang 
1965; Janowitz 1957; 1959; 1960). Certainly, it is hard to find any curiosity about how 
the bureaucracy evident in the systematic organization of death was organized by the 
combatants, particularly against non-combatant populations.  It fell to a much later 
scholar to do this, who is, indeed, Jewish and one of the world’s most eminent intellec-
tuals, but one who did not flee to the United States and who is not an organization 
theorist. He remained in Eastern Europe until the late 1960s, when he moved to Leeds 
University in Yorkshire, England, from where he has maintained a prodigious output of 
innovative sociological scholarship, most recently focusing on ‘liquid modernity’. 
Somewhat earlier in his career the focus was also on how modernity made that which 
was solid disappear – but in smoke and ashes rather than melting away. 
Zygmunt Bauman is notable for many outstanding contributions to social sci-
ence, especially Modernity and the Holocaust (1989). It is a work of great organizational 
significance, although this fact seems to have escaped the majority of writers and au-
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thorities in the field, for it is rarely cited in the standard journals or subject outlines 
(exceptions include Burrell 1997, 1994; Fleming/Spicer 2007; Grey 2005. One should 
also see Weiss 2000; Adams/Balfour 2001; Hinings/Mauws 2004). Bauman’s argu-
ment is that bureaucratic rationality was one of the essential factors that made the 
Holocaust possible. The usual explanation of the Holocaust is that it was a reversion 
to barbarism. On the contrary, says Bauman. The mechanics of the Holocaust were 
made possible by precisely those features of society that made it ‘civilized’, chief 
amongst which was rational bureaucracy. Rational bureaucracy was used to try and re-
solve what was referred to as the ‘Jewish Question’, one which flew from the premise 
that Jews were a contagious plague, a pestilence, the other on whom hatred could be 
focused. The answer was to be found in a ‘final solution’ organized around extermina-
tion, the Holocaust. 
If a central aspect of the Holocaust concerned its organizational possibility, 
wouldn’t one think that this might be a central theme of contemporary organization 
studies? Wouldn’t organization studies want to focus on this case as an exemplifica-
tion of how what was good in organization could produce what was evil in human ac-
tion? Might it not want to comb through the records of the Holocaust to identify the 
trail that the Gestapo left behind or conduct oral histories of the few of its victims to 
survive?  Or should it simply seek absolution for its silence? The sounds of silence and 
the need for absolution are overwhelming: I know only of one such oral organiza-
tional historical account (through the work of Chris Grey [2005]) that explicitly en-
gages with the Holocaust, by Madsen and Willert (1996), who examine the structure of 
daily life in a Nazi work camp. While organizational behaviorists, such as Milgram 
(1974), have researched the behavioral characteristics of authoritarianism, the organ-
izational design aspects have been less studied.
In the remainder of the paper I outline, first, Goffman’s account of ‘total institu-
tions’ and Foucault’s notion of ‘the gaze’; this is preparatory to a discussion of how 
the gaze was organized and imposed on the Jews by the Nazi’s. Next, the paper moves 
to a discussion of how, after the mechanism of the gaze had created the ghetto, the 
next organizational step was the transition of bodies from being held captive in the 
gaze, with all the associated practices that this entailed, to being entrapped within total 
institutions.  Within the total institution of the concentration and death camps a num-
ber of technologies of power were evident. These relate to identity and power, expert 
knowledge, the design of efficient organizations, organizing mass destruction, design-
ing an efficient open system, and organizing to overcome humanism. No discussion 
of power is seemingly complete without some discussion of resistance and so a spe-
cific case study is provided of resistance in an occupied territory that prevented the 
formation of a ghetto and the transmission of its inmates to a total institution.  In 
conclusion some ethical lessons for organization theory are drawn and some implica-
tions for the analysis of power suggested.  
Organizing extreme power 
Over six million people had careers of increasingly intense incarceration that typically 
began with spatial concentration in a ghetto and ended in organized death in camps. 
The ghettoes and the camps are best thought of, organizationally, as instances of what 
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the sociologist Erving Goffman (1961) referred to as ‘total institutions’. Goffman 
(1961) coined the term, ‘total institutions’, to refer to a class of concentrated power. 
Total institutions comprise practices and operating mechanisms which inscribe domi-
nation on a particular target, such as those classed as insane, criminal, Jewish, Indige-
nous, fallen women, elite schoolchildren in boarding schools, orphans, sailors, etc.  
Total institutions include organizations that make people inmates against their will, 
such as a prison or detention center, which are often parts of a broader apparatus of 
power – in this case juridical and penal power – but they can also include organiza-
tions founded on membership contracted on voluntary inclusion: for instance, a pro-
fessional army, a boarding school, a residential college, or a religious retreat such as a 
monastery or convent. People within total institutions are cut off from the wider soci-
ety, leading an enclosed and formally administered existence. What these very differ-
ent types of organizations have in common that make them total institutions are that 
each member’s daily life is carried out in the immediate presence of a large number of 
others. The members are very visible; there is no place to hide from the surveillance of 
others. The members tend to be strictly regimented and often wear institutional cloth-
ing such as uniforms. Life in a total institution is governed by strict, formal, rational 
planning of time. (Think of school bells for lesson endings and beginnings, factory 
whistles, timetables, schedules, bugle calls in the barracks, and so on.) Hence, mem-
bers of total institutions are not free to choose how they spend their time; instead, it is 
strictly prescribed for them. It is because of this that the members lose a degree of 
autonomy because of an all-encompassing demand for conformity to the authoritative 
interpretation of rules. In such contexts, the organization has more or less monopoly 
control of its members’ everyday lives. Goffman’s argument is that total institutions 
demonstrate in heightened and condensed form the underlying organizational proc-
esses that can be found, albeit in much less extreme cases, in more normal organiza-
tions. Goffman chose extremes because the everyday mechanisms of authority and 
power were much more evident there than in the world of the corporate ‘organization 
man’ (Whyte 1960). 
In many ways Goffman anticipated the themes that were later to become popular 
in Foucault’s (1977) work—the power of incarceration, rules and surveillance—
although instead of focusing on design he studied action, which undoubtedly gave 
greater acuity to his analyses—we are dealing with what people actually do in Goff-
man – not what the designers of their institutions intend them do. Institutions are to-
tal when they surround the person at every turn and cannot be escaped; they produce 
and reproduce the normalcy of life inside the institution, however abnormal it might 
seem from outside (Deleuze 1992). For Foucault, the essence of incarceration, rules 
and surveillance began with organizing ‘the gaze’.  
Organizing the gaze  
Foucault (1977: 177) stresses that ‘the techniques of surveillance, the ‘physics’ of 
power, the hold over the body, operate according to the laws of optics and mechanics, 
according to a whole play of spaces, lines, screens, beams, degrees, and without re-
course, in principle, at least, to excess, force or violence’ and that it ‘is a power that 
seems all the less ‘corporeal’ in that it is subtly ‘physical’’ Foucault misses a character-
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istic aspect of the twentieth century. The means of power have often been over-
whelmingly violent, based upon confinement against the will of those subject to con-
finement, and abuse of the dignity and bodies of those confined. For Foucault, the to-
tal institution is a pre-modern device; its corporeality of power belongs to pre-modern 
times, not the modern age.1 The history of his present suggests otherwise; Foucault 
lived through Vichy and the Nazi period as a teenager. There is no doubt that the 
Nazi’s were experts in moving from what Foucault (1977) termed the gaze, through 
the selective use of members’ categorization devices (Sacks 1992), to the construction 
of a career, in the sociological sense of that term, often terminal, in a total institution 
(The autobiography of Janina Bauman 1986, Winter in the afternoon: the recollections of a 
young girl in the Warsaw Ghetto, is a narrative account, by one of the fortunate survivors, 
who resisted and lived to tell the tale, of how the controls of that total institution 
tightened.)2
The juridical eye of the state increasingly fixed the gaze, promulgating special laws 
and decrees. Devices, such as the star that all Jews were obliged to wear prominently 
on their clothing, or the labeling of businesses as Jewish with prominent signage, were 
used. After the gaze came confinement, initially through being rounded up and herded 
into ghettos, where began the career inside the total institution proper. For many mil-
lions it was to end, after transportation jammed in cattle-trucks on the rail systems of 
Europe, in some unknown place in Eastern Europe that the world ought never to for-
get. The final experience might last no longer than it took to strip and have a commu-
nal shower. For many, the final destination of the gas chambers was the end of what 
had been a long and slow career in settings of increasing intensity, while for a few the 
struggles to survive continued in the work camps associated with the whole business. 
And business it was, as we shall see.  
The Jew as the object of the gaze  
Under National Socialism the organizational form that we know from Goffman (1961) 
as a total institution became a particular device for organizing relations between Ger-
mans and selected others in the territories that Germany controlled and conquered. Why 
should this be so? Higgins (2004: 89) suggests that the Prussian elite had constructed the 
                                                          
1  Especially in his work on gender Goffman (1976) was far more attuned to the embodi-
ment of power, as we shall see. Few other writers on organizations stress the embodiment 
of power, although the anthropologist James Scott (1990) is an exception but one hardly 
regarded as a contributing author to the organization and management theory canon, de-
spite his analyses of total institutions.  
2  Janina Bauman’s account is brilliant and should be read but one should also look at the 
following web site:   
http://www.war-experience.org/history/keyaspects/wghetto0443/default.asp. In a later 
publication, Janina Bauman (2002) reflects, methodologically, on the writing of her life 
histories. I use the plural, advisedly, as there is a successor book, A dream of belonging
(Bauman 1988), which recounts her post-war experiences. Here, the stifling provincialism 
of small town life and work as a librarian in a secondary modern school become another 
kind of total institution with the only way out, seemingly, a dream of belonging to another 
type of total institution defined by a Zionist state.  
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German project of modernity exclusively in terms of an ethnic nationalism. It was a na-
tionalism that demanded its own strangers, outsiders, and enemies to be viable, a role 
which Jews had been playing for centuries. They were shortly to be cast the starring role 
in the horror that Fascism was to orchestrate. And orchestrate is an apt verb. The Nazi 
state was a despotism that relied on stage-management, propaganda, and spectacle as its 
major organizational devices for creating unity, coherence, and support to eliminate not 
only Jewish people but also polyphony more generally. 
The Third Reich was a state developed on the basis of power and myth. Power 
came from National Socialists command of the state apparatuses after 1933. German 
history provided the myth it orchestrated. The myth was that of the German Volk and 
its supremacy, which provided ‘values and meaning and ideas and plans and strata-
gems and alternative forms of social organization … an oversimplified representation 
of a more complex reality’ (Bailey 1977: 7). The signifier of the myth, the ascendant 
Reich, presented itself as belonging to a history of the German people. In this way its 
meaning was already complete and projected into the future; it postulated a past, a 
memory, and comparative ordering of facts, ideas and decisions, a destiny denied by 
the 1919 Treaty of Versailles but made insistent (Barthes 1957). When this destiny as-
sumed a form that captured the state, it rapidly assumed the form of caricature, pas-
tiche, and elaborate stage managed symbols that did ‘away with all dialectics, with any 
going back beyond what is immediately visible, … a world which is without contradic-
tions because it is without depth, a world wide open … wallowing in the evident’ 
(from Mythologies).3
The consequences of authoritarian populism and aborted modernization meeting 
the naturalized myth of the Volk were alarming. The defeat of the First World War 
had aborted that project of German nationalism that had been achieved and imposed 
from above by elites, positioning the German nation as a people of manifest destiny, a 
positioning that the First World War stopped in its tracks. When it was revived by 
Hitler the Nazi’s changed the nationalist project from one that was defined by elites to 
one that was to be defined in more popular ways. It became a popular project in a 
context where, after the collapse of the Weimar Republic, there were few state or civil 
society resources and few national or civic sources of moral values, education, or au-
thority outside of the National Socialist Party. Moreover, there was little in the way of 
‘constitutionalism, the rule of law, democracy, civil society, the institutions to negoti-
ate cultural and racial diversity … There was nothing to prevent the normalization of 
discrimination and oppression’ (Higgins 2004: 90). The project of normalization fused 
several rationalities, not just the rationality of modernity as Bauman (1989) sees it, but 
also elements that in themselves were hardly remarkable, as they could be found in 
comparable polities elsewhere. The Swedish social democrats of the inter-war period, 
for instance, were as keen on eugenic projects and no less statist. However, what the 
Nazi’s had in addition was a much stronger degree of racism and a very clear category 
of the Other, through which they could define their German self, using the category 
of the Jew in this role. Moreover, at the level of micro-politics, the Nazi’s sought to 
                                                          
3  Accessed on March 29, 2005, from  
http://carbon.cudenver.edu/~mryder/itc_data/barthes/myth_today.html 
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implement their myths – based on blood, race and territory – in all the spheres of eve-
ryday life, such as the family, the youth group, and the neighborhood, through capil-
laries of power such as the Hitler Youth (see Rose 1999: 25-16). 
Organizing the Final Solution  
It was sometime between the June 1941 offensive against the Soviet Union and January 
1942 that the decision was made to exterminate the Jews of Europe (see Mosse 1978), 
although something of the idea was already evident in speeches by Hitler in 1919 and in 
Mein Kampf (1924). It was not a sudden decision. The pressure against the Jews built 
up steam after the Nazis came to power on 30 January 1933. Judicial harassment intensi-
fied in the period leading up to war with ‘bans on employment, on practicing profes-
sions, on owning a car or a phone, on going to the theatre, on marrying or having sexual 
relations with gentiles’ (Higgins 2004: 86). At the same time, various options were 
sought to deal with the ‘Jewish Question’, including forced resettlement, with Madagas-
car even being suggested as a destination. Extermination was the final solution. 
Once extermination was adopted as an end the top management team deployed 
the rule of anticipated reaction to mobilize management sentiment. As Higgins (2004: 
87) notes, in the disorderly and crony-ridden world of Nazi politics, much as in any 
organization where to succeed means impressing the boss, Senior Nazis who were ‘ri-
vals tried to outshine each other in Hitler’s eyes through their bold initiatives in carry-
ing out what they often had to second-guess as his intentions. Massacring the Jews in 
one’s jurisdiction offered a sure-fire way to impress the boss. Once one crony hit on it 
the rest followed suit.’
It is not clear who decided that extermination was the appropriate solution, or 
when they decided. It was certainly the case that it was formally communicated to the 
top management team of the Nazi project who met on January 20, 1942, in Wannsee, 
to plan the extermination of Europe’s Jews. Adolf Eichmann, Head of the Depart-
ment for Jewish Affairs, led the Reich’s effort for the Final Solution, efficiently orga-
nizing the roundup and transportation of millions of Jews to their deaths at infamous 
camps such as Auschwitz.4 Two thirds of all victims were liquidated in just 18 months, 
from 22 June 1941 to 31 December 1942, according to the Third Reich’s chief statisti-
cian, Richard Koherr (Higgins 2004: 98).  
                                                          
4  After World War II, Eichmann escaped capture and lived in Germany for five years be-
fore moving to Argentina, where he lived under an alias for another ten years. Israeli 
agents finally captured him in 1960, and Eichmann was subsequently indicted in Israel for 
crimes against humanity. Eichmann’s defense was that he was a bureaucrat who had to 
just follow orders (An account of his trial was written by Hannah Arendt [1994], who 
coined the memorable phrase ‘the banality of evil’ to register interpretation of the events 
reported there.) Although Eichmann was subsequently found guilty and executed, his de-
fense was important because it posed the question of the extent to which a person who is 
obedient to organizationally legitimate authority can be held accountable as an individual 
for his or her actions. It is a point that has a contemporary salience.  In relation to recent 
corporate scandals in the US and elsewhere the guilty managers often say that they were 
simply following orders. 
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Six million bodies disappeared from the face of the earth as a result of the Holo-
caust, including one and half million children. The ultimate goal would have seen the 
extermination of 11 million Jews; the war’s end saw about 50% of the target achieved, 
given that the six million also included other categories constituted as deviant, such as 
the feeble, homosexual, communists, gypsies and so on. By any calculus the efficient 
dispatch of millions of state-stigmatized people to their deaths by the German state 
during World War II was an enormous organizational achievement.5 Indeed, Rose 
(1999: 26) suggests that the actual power of Nazism ‘was its capacity to render itself 
technical, to connect itself up with all manner of technologies capable of implement-
ing its nightmarish dreams into everyday existence.’ There were quite specific rationali-
ties, techniques, one might say, behind the technologies. We shall now turn to these. 
Technologies of total institutional power 
Identity and power 
The project of Fascism entailed an ongoing construction of an organizational politics 
of identity and non-identity. Identities were established through the use of various 
stigmatizing ‘membership categorization devices’ (Sudnow 1972; Sacks 1992).6 There 
was no need for any subtlety in interpreting the Nazi’s use of membership categoriza-
tion devices. Terms such as ‘Jews,’ ‘Gypsies,’ ‘homosexuals,’ and ‘the feeble’, which 
the Nazi’s used, needed no inferential reasoning. They were not ‘natural’ categories 
but were produced by a vast organizational apparatus to appear naturalized. A funda-
mental organizational condition of the Holocaust was the identification of individuals 
as members of specific categories, and the marking of their membership categoriza-
tion with devices. In the case of Jews, these were the distinctive devices that all those 
who were defined as Jews were obliged to wear; in Germany the yellow star, in the 
                                                          
5  If the growth of western modernity is a story of organization it is also a story of death and 
destruction wreaked by these same organizational capabilities.  The conquest that fol-
lowed the ‘discovery’ of the Americas or the Antipodes, for instance, was another enter-
prise requiring enormous organizational achievements of ship building, navigation, occu-
pation, extraction and exploration. Of course, in the case of the Americas it was military 
and religious bureaucracy that played the main role. This historical event, considered by 
scholars such as Dussel (1992) as the beginning of modernity, needs to be reevaluated in 
organizational terms. What was unique about the Holocaust was that it was much more 
spatially and temporally concentrated and confined and the other that it constituted dwelt 
in the midst of the categories of reason, not outside, not as something constituted as sav-
age, wild and alien. The European other was, in fact, at the heart of some of its most 
celebrated cultural achievements.  
6 Sacks (1992: 338) showed how analysis of membership categorization devices could be 
used as a tool of political analysis of organizations with an example from the former So-
viet Union. The USSR used to publish the names of ‘profiteers’. People could see that 
these were Jewish names. The Soviet state could thereby continue to deny that it was anti-
Semitic (since it did not call these people Jews), while deflecting grievances aimed at its 
own economic inadequacies. It used members’ categorization devices – ordinary language 
ways of making sense in common currency – from which all could infer the meaning 
clearly enough.  
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Warsaw ghetto a white band with a blue star.7 Businesses were also marked: During 
the boycott upon Jewish stores that the Nazi’s declared on April 1, 1933, yellow Stars 
of David were painted on windows. These markers of identity singled out those who 
were destined for special categorization and total institutionalization, entailing concen-
tration of clearly inscribed identities in specific spaces, initially, in ghettos such as that 
in Warsaw, and latterly, their spatial segregation in camps8. Confined, segregated, and 
marked, they were much easier to control. The orderly and efficient marshalling of 
bodies was required. These bodies were transported across Europe in cattle-trucks and 
efficiently scheduled as inputs into the death camps. If the trains had not run on time, 
the points not been set up correctly, the machinery of death would have been inter-
rupted. One historian, Goldhagen (1996), argues controversially that order and effi-
ciency depended on hundreds and thousands of small acts of organized goal-
orientation by civilian German citizens and collaborators in the occupied territories.9
By this calculus, making the trains run on time, switching the tracks, and being indif-
ferent to the cargo being transported were equally acts of complicity with the machin-
ery of death.10
                                                          
7  There is a good discussion of the introduction of the yellow star by the Nazi’s at 
http://history1900s.about.com/library/holocaust/aa031298.htm. Interestingly, as the site 
says, the Nazis merely intensified, magnified, and institutionalized an age-old method of 
persecution with this labeling: the practices of total institutions are not something sub-
stantively different to normal organization practices.  In 807 Abbassid caliph Haroun al-
Raschid ordered all Jews to wear a yellow belt and a tall, cone-like hat. But it was in 1215 
that the Fourth Lateran Council, presided over by Pope Innocent III, made its infamous 
decree, Canon 68, which declared that ‘Jews and Saracens [Muslims] of both sexes in 
every Christian province and at all times shall be marked off in the eyes of the public 
from other peoples through the character of their dress.’ This Council represented all of 
Christendom and thus this decree was to be enforced throughout all of the Christian 
countries. While the star is usually represented as being yellow, it was not always. It varied 
with local practice. In the Warsaw ghetto it was blue, as Janina Bauman explains –see 
http://www.war-experience.org/history/keyaspects/wghetto0443/default.asp.  The prac-
tice of using a badge to single out and identify Jews was instituted in the fifteenth century 
in Germany and Austria. The practice was not new. Indeed, like much else associated 
with the Holocaust, there was tradition associated with it.  
8  Again, the existence of camps was not new: the British first used concentration camps in 
the nineteenth century Boer War against the Afrikaners in Southern Africa; prior to this 
time camps were a common device for holding those captured and about to be sold into 
slavery in other parts of Africa.  
9  There are not only all these small acts of commission, agency and responsibility to consider. 
There are also the small acts of omission by the allies: the news about Auschwitz did get out 
– the Vatican and the western allies were informed by one of the four escapees from 
Auschwitz, Rudolf Vrba. One consequence was that the USAF bombed the synthetic fuel 
and rubber plant that formed a part of the complex – as Higgins (2004) suggests, it was a 
target enjoying strategic significance.  
10  The question of collective guilt has been raised by Karl Jaspers (2001), who sees the gen-
eration of Germans who lived through the Third Reich and served as active participants 
in Hitler’s world as jointly responsible for what happened there and then, in a political, 
336  Stewart Clegg: Bureaucracy, the Holocaust and Techniques of Power at Work 
Expert knowledge 
When the trains arrived at the camp, doctors made a ‘selection’ using expert knowl-
edge to decide which of the new arrivals were fit to be worked to death. Life for the 
slave laborers was often unbearable and many would die of overwork, starvation and 
disease Less than 10% were chosen to be slave laborers; most were dispatched straight 
to the ‘showers’, after first disrobing. Those who were selected for the gas chambers 
had all markers of identity removed, by being stripped, shorn, with personal items, 
such as jewelry taken. Such denial and degradation of identity is typical of total institu-
tional practice, even if its extermination is not. 
Efficient power means that systematic attention has to be paid to its means. By 
1944, when the Jews from Hungary were deported to Auschwitz, the death factory 
was unable to absorb the mass numbers.  It was estimated that in the spring of 1944, 
46,000 Jews were killed in one day.  Such efficiency requires a dedicated organizational 
apparatus. Crude organizational technologies assisted in this huge project. The Hol-
lerith machine was used ‘to track the Jewish populations and accumulate information 
regarding the ‘success’ of the Genocide’ (Levfenthal 1995). The machine was ‘a primi-
tive calculating engine and precursor of the modern computer developed by the statis-
tician and census taker, Herman Hollerith,’ and manufactured by the IBM subsidiary 
DEHOMAG (Deutsche Hollerith Maschinen Gesellschaft) (Leventhal 1995).  
The destruction of those collected and defined in their identity as Jews and other 
stigmatized categories would not have been possible without application of an intrinsi-
cally instrumental and value-free science. It is, of course, this kind of science that lies behind 
the conception of the organization as an open system. It is this abstraction that en-
ables one to conjure up an organization science in which the specificities and particu-
larities of concrete practices can be reduced to the mechanism of variation, selection 
and retention, the resolution of equivocality in an open system fed by inputs, organ-
ized around a central workflow that defines the throughput, producing outputs. The 
inputs were living bodies; the transformation process one of chemically induced death; 
the outputs corpses with the value stripped out of them. An efficient total institution prem-
ised on the efficient transformation of its raw material inputs required a factory system for its flows of 
power, with efficiencies of scale in processing inputs and creating outputs, that could, literally, re-
duce something to nothing (Ritzer 2004), people to ashes, dust and detritus. In so do-
ing it not only created efficiencies but also destroyed futures by dividing societies, 
families, friends, communities, workers, creating a vacuum where the foundational 
identity of generations yet unborn should have made its mark, inducing guilt and 
shame about surviving for those that remained.  
                                                                                                                               
moral, and metaphysical sense. I would want to extend this sense of responsibility to the 
use that was made of rational organization technologies of power in the camps. These 
technologies are in themselves political, moral and metaphysical practices for which or-
ganization leaders have an ethical responsibility: they are not merely a neutral instrument 
waiting to have value poured into them in application. The technologies of power dis-
cussed in this paper have a metaphysic of domination embedded in them. 
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Organizing mass destruction 
Bauman (1989: 8) referred to Feingold’s (1983: 399f.) argument to establish that 
Auschwitz was an extension of the value rationality of the modern factory system, 
whose ‘raw material was human beings and … end-product … death’. In the early sta-
ges, bullets delivered death, but these were needed for the front line. Anyway, they 
were slow and inefficient; it would have taken hundreds of years to shoot every Jew in 
Europe. Initially, there were many concentration camps, in which death was an inci-
dental cost of confinement in horrific conditions, while originally there were only four 
death camps (Chelmno, Belzec, Sobibór and Treblinka which were all in rural Poland). 
These resembled a cottage industry of killing compared to the two conglomerates 
(combining slave labor with extermination) that the Nazis established. Majdanek and 
Auschwitz, of which Auschwitz was the largest and most developed. In pursuit of 
their key performance indicator, the extermination of the Jews, the Nazis organized 
for economies of scale. Estimates are that 1,500,000 people, most of whom were Jews, 
died at Auschwitz. Others who died at Auschwitz included Soviet prisoners of war, 
Gypsies or Roma, Poles, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, and political opponents 
of the Nazi regime.  
Auschwitz was designed so that two transports per day, each with 6,000 Jews, 
could be ‘processed’. These 12,000 Jews would have their heads shaved, clothing col-
lected and stored, be gassed and cremated all within a 24 hour period.  Within 24 
hours, all traces of their bodily existence were obliterated from the face of the earth, 
apart from their hair, skin, gold fillings, prosthetics, dentures and anything else that 
could be re-cycled, because, short of a budget for the killing machine, a user-pays phi-
losophy prevailed as the victims funded their own deaths through their corpses being 
made a source of value. The SS ran profitable industries dealing in what it re-cycled 
from the dead and produced through slave labor. It also got kickbacks from Krupp, 
Volkswagen and IG Farben, amongst others, for the labor it supplied (Leventhal 1995; 
see also Borkin 1978; Hayes 1991).   
There were willing accomplices in power-networks elsewhere. Vincent (1997) 
demonstrates how the Nazis were able to use the secrecy associated with Swiss bank-
ing to bank the assets realized (also see Bower 1977; Levin 1999). These were not iso-
lated crimes by a few evil people but required considerable networks of expertise and 
involvement (Raab 2003). In this way, the Holocaust can be seen as a bureaucratic re-
gime of power with many capillaries and considerable expertise in its service. 
On the whole, the process that was adopted was a simple system of mass destruc-
tion, of flows, throughputs, and outputs. It wasn’t designed like this from the outset. 
The Auschwitz complex included three main camps and 39 smaller camps 40 miles 
southwest of Krakow. As Higgins (2004: 133) tells it, Auschwitz grew from a barracks 
left over from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was initially equipped with a 
small gas chamber and crematorium. Innovation was concentrated on Auschwitz II, a 
satellite camp adjacent to the village of Birkenau. Most of the 1.5 million were killed at 
Auschwitz-Birkenau, the second of the main camps. It was here that the railway ran 
right into the camp, beneath the sign reading ‘Work makes us free’ (Arbeit macht frei). 
Initially, it too was run on pre-industrial lines. There was a 30 meter run from the un-
338  Stewart Clegg: Bureaucracy, the Holocaust and Techniques of Power at Work 
dressing sheds to the gas chambers and the corpses were bundled into pits and burnt 
after dispatch. However, in March 1943 a modernized, integrated high capacity infra-
structure was established as a greenfield development, with four separate plants, each 
with its own crematorium and gas chamber.  
The actual chemical agent of death, Zyklon B, was initially used as an insecticide 
(for delousing clothing) in WW I but was subsequently developed as an agent for hu-
man extermination during WW II by the German chemical multinational, IG Farben. 
Many experiments and refinements were involved, with great scientific rationality be-
ing devoted to the topic of extermination by chemists and their co-workers over sev-
eral years, to establish the appropriate level of concentration, temperature, and time of 
application to suit the new purpose (Dworkf/Peltz 1996). The gas was a cheap means 
of destruction: that was its attraction for the economic rationalists running the camps. 
Other economic efficiencies of the day involved practicing sustainable recycling for 
profits, minimizing service intervals to contain running costs, and externalizing the 
costs of side products, such as tailings. The management was exemplary in its techni-
cal and economic efficiency. As a business it used the best practice principles of its 
day; ashes and tailings were dumped in the nearest river as an externality with no cost; 
energy was powered somewhat more sustainably – human fat from the victims fired 
the furnaces. 
Designing an efficient open system 
The death camps were a simple open system in which the inputs were living bodies 
that were subject to an initial selection, variation and retention. Those selected were 
gassed and burnt, although at times of peak throughput, those who could not be ac-
commodated in the gas chambers and crematorium were shot and burned in mass pits 
in the grounds of Birkenau. Variation was simple as those able-bodied enough were 
retained and worked until death. The outputs were the elimination of the great uncer-
tainty that stalked Nazi Europe, seen as the possibility of contagion of Aryan purity by 
Jewish bodies. The equivocality was resolved by the death of the contagious bodies.  
How was such a system possible? First, it was highly authorized. The highest au-
thority sanctioned this organizational action. That a strong leader tells followers to do 
things, management scholars might think, could be a good reason actually to do them, 
because they are the leader and their will is usually fulfilled. A strong leader is assumed 
to have good reasons, so the person follows in good faith. In addition, the leader 
commands a mighty organizational apparatus, which, in this case, had a monopoly 
over the means of violence. Eichmann’s commitment to Hitler as a strong authority 
figure shaped his behavior. The SS themselves were an authoritative elite; most ‘of the 
leaders of the Einsatzgruppen, the mass-shooting squads who murdered up to a third 
of all the Holocaust victims, held PhDs or Doctors of Laws. They were the principal 
bearers of German civilization, not low-lifers, misfits or retards’ (Higgins 2004: 98). 
Many careers were advanced in academia, science, philosophy, economics, genetics, 
geography, education, social work, and history in the service of the Holocaust. And 
their authority and actions were minutely documented in memoranda, data, statistics, 
and reports. 
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Second, it was highly routinized. Routines eliminate the need or the space for re-
flection. When actions that enact the organizational action in question are routinized, 
the acts in question become easier to enact. Routine is important because it facilitates 
action without reflection (and responsibility), as an automatic response to a stimulus. 
Individuals become merely a cog in the big machinery that turns them around. One 
sees only a small part of the whole organizational machinery when accomplishing a 
task; one cannot see where and how the task fits into the big picture, nor can one see 
its consequences as an outcome of the task or organization. This may seem an absurd 
point – for are not all modern organizations premised on routines and routinization – 
but the point is not that this, on its own, makes horror possible, but that in the appro-
priate context it can do so when other conditions are present.  
Routinization, we might say, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. For in-
stance, Reserve Police Battalion 101, 500 middle-aged reservists who were active in 
Poland, was engaged in the task of shooting defenseless civilians. They ‘ended up 
murdering 38,000 individuals and consigning another 44,200 to the maw of the Treb-
linka death camp. 500 ordinary men with a combined body count of 83,000 civilians 
… as it carried out more massacres, the majority of the men fell into a matter-of-fact 
routine, whilst a minority began to enjoy their work, embellishing it with gratuitous 
humiliation of and cruelty towards their victims’ (Higgins 2004: 100). 
Third, in exercising total institutional power it is much easier to act with extreme 
prejudice towards those who are the victims of the action, or the subjects of power, 
when they are dehumanized. When ideological definitions and indoctrination convince 
organizational members that the victims are less than human, it creates distance be-
tween organizational members and the people who are affected by its action, and the 
human costs can be borne with greater equanimity as a necessary cost of a greater 
good – progress, the state, the Party or whatever it takes to still conscience. Represent-
ing victims as numbers rather than people also makes it also easier to forget the ethical 
consequences of actions. A generalized condition of organizational modernity is that 
only what can be counted counts (Power 1997; Brunsson/Jacobsson 2002).11
When actions are performed at a distance on people defined as administrative 
categories, the people are effectively dehumanized (Kelman 1973). The more dehu-
manized they are, the easier becomes the application of pure technique to their cases. 
Dehumanization involves the production of others whose most characteristic feature 
is their Otherness, their being different in essence from those who constitute them as 
such, as outside a space in which their exists a shared moral scope. The novelist Ian 
McEwan notes that the ‘trick, as always, the key to human success and domination, is 
to be selective in your mercies. For all the discerning talk, it’s the close at hand, the visible 
that exerts the overpowering force’ (McEwan 2005: 127, my emphasis). Those whom 
one sees as essentially similar to oneself, as sharing in a common being and meaning, 
                                                          
11  In Spielberg’s (1993) film, it is when Oscar Schindler spots a little girl in a bright red coats 
amidst the black and white and drab colours of those being rounded up, when her indi-
vidual humanity shines out to him in all its bright luminosity, that he ceases to be a by-
stander (Higgins 2004: 94-5). He sees an individual amidst the mass, something that 
organizational modernity discourages. 
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are that much harder to destroy. What you don’t see or can’t recognize as someone 
who is just like you needn’t bother you. What you can keep at arms length outside o-
nes intimate fold of humanity is easier to defile.  
When the subjective can be reduced to the objective, when the qualitative can be 
represented quantitatively as a bottom-line calculation it is so much easier to make ra-
tional decisions (cut costs, trim fat, speed throughput, increase efficiency, defeat the 
competition) without concern for the human, environmental, or social effects of these 
decisions. Again, it goes back to the value-free basis of management science. If one is 
cutting costs to become more efficient it is much easier, morally, to represent these 
costs abstractly rather than to have to deal with them personally (Moore 1989/2003).  
Organizing to overcome humanism 
The most effective way of overcoming humanity is to treat those categories of person 
with which one will deal harshly as, in some respects not fully, wholly or essentially 
human in the way that normal, well-formed people like us can be taken to be. Make 
them the Other. Such sleights in casting identity enable one to maintain distance.  
There are many ways of maintaining distance. One technique, of course, is through 
physical separation and isolation. The constant trains and fumes from the furnaces 
perhaps occasionally perturbed ordinary Polish citizens going about their everyday life, 
yet nonetheless they remained separate from the camps, which were a spatially con-
fined zone. Technique enables distantiation. When we master a technique, even when 
it comprises methods of brutal interrogation, intimidation or torture, skill in the tech-
nique has its own charm, aesthetics, and beauty, such that technicians can take sheer 
delight in using it, irrespective of its moral effects, resulting in ‘the irrelevance of moral 
standards for the technical success of the bureaucratic operation’ (Bauman 1989: 101; italics in 
original).
Divisions of labor in complex chains of power enable elites to maintain distance 
from power’s effects. Where these effects can be represented in terms of intermediary 
forms of data (kill rates, efficiency statistics, and so on) it also helps. Whatever may be 
our small labor input moves minute cogs in a bureaucratic machine necessarily inter-
meshed with so many others that we are just one small element in the overall scheme 
of things. We don’t even have to try to understand the totality. And if, perchance we 
do understand, we realize that we can’t do anything to change the situation, thus pro-
ducing immobility reinforcing conformism. The system of which we are a part is re-
sponsible, not us.  
When technique is paramount, action becomes purely a question of technical 
power in terms of the use of means to achieve given ends. For instance, as a master of 
logistics, Eichmann was enormously proud of his achievements in the complex sche-
duling of trains, camps, and death. He was, as he said, a good bureaucrat. There are 
two profound effects of organizational power that makes people technically accoun-
table and responsible for results expressed in a purely quantitative form. It makes the 
person doing the task utterly transparent. Either the targets are achieved or they are 
not. Targets relieve one of moral indeterminacy. If one is authorized to do something 
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thing and given targets to achieve by superordinates guiding strategies and plans, obe-
dience surely is appropriate, and authority should be served.12
Obedience to power is encouraged where organization work is a ceaseless round 
of activity with little room for reflection, where activity is mostly just a small link in a 
great chain of doing. Most organizational members are in the middle of organizational 
chains whose links are not always clear. People are not always aware of the conse-
quences of what they do and do not do. Most of the time, they are just doing what 
they are told (shred those files, write those checks, dispatch those troops, and main-
tain those train schedules).  In the death camps, those who were the subjects of power 
were made complicit in its exercise. Orderlies, handlers of dead bodies, strippers of 
skin, hair, gold, jewelry, and dentures were nominated from amongst those who had 
yet to meet their fate. Participation in the horror preserved them for the time being.  
Resisting the Final Solution 
Note that in this framework of total institutional power there has, as yet, been no 
mention of resistance. Where there was such resistance it often occurred in individual 
rather than collective terms through acts of self-annihilation by ultimate gestures of 
existential choice that refused total power its routinized predictability. It is extremely 
difficult to outflank a total institution from within its strategies of organizational to-
talisation: this is especially the case given the extreme time-space compression of the 
death camps. The camps were spatially highly circumscribed and the career of most 
inmates was terminated very quickly – within 24 hours of arrival. Control of the or-
ganizational apparatus, routinization of power in many small acts, extensive division 
and dehumanization, and responsible, regulated violence are hard to overcome when 
one is incorporated in the total institution, especially without recourse to any counter-
vailing institutional powers, such as a system of rank and command.  It is, perhaps, for 
this reason that the literature of total institutions so often celebrates the small acts 
of individual resistance that do occur, because there is so little chance of collective 
resistance as access to organizational means are so limited.13 However, with the ap-
                                                          
12  A great source on the bureaucratic form of the Holocaust is Claude Lanzmann’s (1985) 
brilliant film SHOAH based on interviews with people who participated in its unfolding. 
Director Claude Lanzmann spent 11 years tracking people down, cajoling them to talk, 
asking them questions they didn’t want to face. Shoah shows the mundaneity of terror. 
For instance, German Railways carefully invoiced the Reich for transportation of people 
to the concentration camps. A Treblinkan landowner who sold the land for the camp 
shows disdain for and disinterest in what was done with it, refusing the evidence that had 
been before his eyes, on the smell of the air he breathed in his nostrils, and the anguished 
sounds he could hear in his ears.  
13  These small acts of resistance are the stuff of great fictional contributions to organization 
studies; one thinks, for instance, of Milos Forman’s (1975) film of One Flew over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest, adapted from a novel by Ken Kesey (1973), as well as of Alexander Solz-
henitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (1963) and The Gulag Archipelago (1995). 
These novels offer a greater understanding of the nature of extreme power than is to be 
found anywhere in the canons of organization theory and represent some of the strongest 
examples to be found anywhere of the analysis of power and resistance in organizations.  
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propriate resources resistance was possible – if not in the camps at least in the occu-
pied territories before people were processed into camps. The relative openness of an 
occupied territory compared with the ghetto or a camp made resistance possible 
where there was an ethical will to see a person as a person rather than a representative 
of a category device. 
On average, two-thirds of the Jews in German-controlled territory during World 
War II did not survive (Seibel 2002), but there was significant territorial variance. That 
it is an essential sense of a shared humanity that enables survival from horrors that 
wait unleashing may be seen in the Danish case, which offers a strong counterfactual. 
The Danish resistance movement, assisted by many ordinary citizens, coordinated the 
flight of some 7,200 Jews to safety in nearby neutral Sweden, suggesting that it was in-
deed many small acts of omission and commission that were important in enacting the 
Holocaust. On September 11, 1943, the man in charge of the German occupation in 
Denmark told his head of shipping operations, Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, of plans 
to round up all of the approximately 8,000 Jews in Denmark and transport them to 
the Theresienstadt Concentration Camp. A week later Duckwitz was given more de-
tails. Ships would arrive on September 29 and a coordinated lightening raid would oc-
cur on the night of October 1. On September 25, Duckwitz flew to Sweden and met 
with the Swedish prime minister to ask him to help save Danish Jewry. The prime 
minister sent a telegram to Berlin offering to accept all of the Danish Jews if Germany 
would agree to let them go. Duckwitz returned to Denmark and waited for news. 
When none came, he assumed the Germans had ignored the Swedish request. On 
September 28th he looked up his friend, Hans Hedtoft (who became Prime Minister 
after the war) and told him of the plan. Hedtoft and three of his friends set out to 
warn as many as possible. One of the first he spoke to was the head of the Jewish 
community in Copenhagen, who in disbelief first accused him of lying (German offi-
cials had convincingly denied earlier rumors of the raid). When Copenhagen Jews ca-
me to prayers on Wednesday morning September 29, they were told there would be 
no services that morning nor on Rosh Hashana, which was to begin that evening. In-
stead they were to spread the word of the raid and go into hiding. Christian Danes 
told their Jewish friends and neighbors. Some even looked through the phone book 
for Jewish sounding names to call and warn. 
When the Nazis carried out their raids on the night of October 1, they found less 
than 300 of the 8,000 Jews. Eventually they rounded up only 475 Jews who were sent 
to Theresienstadt. The others had gone into hiding. Within the month of October, 
fishermen had been recruited to transport them to Sweden (which had broadcast their 
willingness to provide them sanctuary after Niels Bohr had convinced them to act 
publicly). Money had been raised to pay fishermen for the risks they took; Jews were 
moved from their hiding places to new hiding places near the ports and beaches used 
to transport them. Danish police were recruited to keep others, including the Ger-
mans, away, and the Jews were ferried to Sweden. One tally was that 5,919 Jews, 1,301 
                                                                                                                               
Especially with the focus on the individual incarcerated and their struggle to preserve 
autonomy, limits of freedom and dignity against overwhelming odds, they represent a 
central contribution to any analysis of power and organizations.  
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half-Jews, and 686 Christians married to Jews (a total of 7,906) were successfully 
transported to safety. A tally of Jewish Holocaust victims in Denmark said only 30 had 
died while en route to Sweden, another 30 committed suicide, and only 51 of the 475 
sent to Theresienstadt did not survive. (The Danes maintained constant contact with 
Nazi officials about the fate of the Jews shipped to Theresienstadt.) The toll among 
the Danish Jewish population was slightly more than 1 percent, which was a remark-
able record. Thanks to this remarkable mass rescue effort, at war’s end Denmark had 
one of the highest Jewish survival rates for any European country.14 No other country 
came close to the Danish percentage of survivors. Here, the active engagement of the 
people as a whole in resisting the Final Solution made an enormous difference, one 
that could have occurred elsewhere but did not. Thus, we may draw a further implica-
tion, that power needs to delegate authorities to dispatch its projects, without which it 
can be deflected, even in total institutional situations.15
                                                          
14  The details of the Danish case were retrieved on 13 February 2005 from 
http://www.goletapublishing.com/jstamps/1001-2.htm. Denmark was exceptional: in 
some other European countries, such as Lithuania and Latvia, the percentage was over 
90% non-survival. In these countries, it was hardly a question of the local populations o-
verlooking the Holocaust but rather of actively furthering it. 
15  The question of Denmark’s relation to the Germans and the Jews during the Second 
World War is very much a current issue in Denmark. In 2005 a central debate in the Dan-
ish media and historical circles focused on the Danish Coalition Cabinet’s actions during 
the War, especially on whether a ‘public apology’ should be made to the Jews for Danish 
co-operation with the German authorities during WW II. The discussion received fresh 
impetus when the Prime Minister of Denmark, the liberal Anders Fog Rasmussen, de-
manded in a meeting with him that the President of Russia, Putin, should make a ‘public 
apology’ for the Soviet suppression of the Baltic counties during the Cold War. Putin de-
nied the request but it raised the issue of whether Denmark should make a ‘public apol-
ogy’ to the Jews, given that recent research is critical about the way co-operation with the 
occupying Germans was carried out from the Danish side and how many large Danish 
companies where involved. At the centre of the debate are decisions made by Erik Julius 
Christian Scavenius (1877-1962), who was the Danish foreign minister 1913-1920 and 
1940-1942, and prime minister 1942-1943. After August 29, 1943, Erik Scavenius lost all 
of his real powers when the German authorities dissolved the Danish government follow-
ing the refusal of that government to crack down on unrest to the satisfaction of the 
German plenipotentiary. Scavenius was thus Prime Minister for some of the Second 
World War as head of a Coalition Cabinet, and before that he had been the Foreign Min-
ister, the most important liaison between the Danish government and the German au-
thorities. He was a diplomat, not an elected politician, and had an elitist approach to gov-
ernment. He was very afraid that emotional public opinion would destabilize his attempts 
to build a compromise between Danish sovereignty and the realities of German occupa-
tion. Scavenius felt strongly that he was Denmark’s most ardent defender. After the war 
there was much recrimination about his stance, particularly from members of the Resis-
tance who felt that he had hindered its cause and threatened Denmark’s national honour. 
He felt that these people were vain, seeking to build their own reputations or political ca-
reers through emotionalism. Debate continues over Scavenius’ legacy. For example, on 
the 60th anniversary of the August 29th dissolution of government, Prime Minister An-
ders Fogh Rasmussen chastised Scavenius for his stance, saying that it was naive and 
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Conclusion 
The paper began with an admonition from William Starbuck that, having lost its con-
nection to world affairs, organization theory today lacks an external mission. The point 
of the paper is to suggest that the connection to world affairs of this immensely 
praxiological discipline has been highly selective and attenuated. The absence of major 
issues occurring in histories of the present being widely discussed amongst its significant 
contributors is striking. Not only was the postwar generation seemingly uninterested in 
the barbarism of which bureaucracy was capable but when it began to contemplate ma-
jor social issues such as the relations of power in societies and organizations it seemed 
unable to shake off some of the normative ordering assumptions of postwar functional-
ism. Power in organization theory failed to connect with theorists such as Goffman 
(1961), with his emphasis on the materiality of spatio-temporal concentration, and in-
stead moved to connect quite rapidly with abstractions such as ‘coping with uncertainty’ 
(Crozier 1964; Hickson et al. 1971).  In thinking about power, despite the example of 
neighbouring scholarship from people such as Hannah Arendt (1970), the connection 
between the organization of power and the Holocaust was simply not made.  
Starbuck (2003) provides us with a possible answer: because their knowledge is an 
instrument of power, scholars in organization theory have become parts of a move-
ment that designs and operates business systems and maintains silences in return for 
some perks, such as tenure in well-salaried positions in business schools. Students in 
these schools, for whom history is boring anyway, do not want to hear sad stories or 
deal with negativity. Scholars who carp on about the past, injustice, viciousness and 
the dirty work of organizations are hardly likely to build glittering careers for them-
selves in the best-funded and most prestigious institutions. Firms such as IBM do not 
want reminding of their complicity with the Nazi regime. Organizations who hire pro-
fessors for their expertise do not want to hear that their present cultural commitment 
programs and intensive regimes of discipline are just a few steps removed from being 
total institutions and thus genealogically connected to atrocity rather than glory.  
The position of scholars is always ambiguous; of necessity they exist somewhere 
between power and the ‘subjects’ of that power, the author of these words being no 
exception to the general rule. Still, it is a matter of choice as to whether one focuses 
one’s gaze on those operating the machinery of power, on the machinery itself, or 
those it damages. Overwhelmingly, the organization theorists’ gaze has seemed more 
fascinated by designing a better machine in the interests of those it serves rather than 
those it damages.
The Holocaust is not a necessary outcome of the sufficient conditions that have 
been identified in this paper.16 Bauman’s location of evil within a particular mode of 
                                                                                                                               
morally unacceptable. However, many historians contend that it was only through 
Scavenius’ policies that Danes – amongst whom the Jewish population was regarded – es-
caped the worst hardships of the War and the atrocities of the Holocaust.
16  Seeing excesses of instrumental rationality or even Western enlightenment as consequen-
tially culminating in mass-murder does not explain all genocide. Consider the slaughter of 
Armenians conducted by the Turks in the early 20th century, for example, or that commit-
ted in Rwanda more recently, where 1.5 million people were murdered, not in total insti-
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organizing is, perhaps, too narrow.  The same mode of organizing (e.g. bureaucracy) 
can assist both the perpetrators as well as the victims; also, for some scholars barba-
rism is at least as much a matter of personality – that is, a result of internal not exter-
nal distancing – than of organizational form, at least according to Adorno et al.’s 
(1950) account of the ‘authoritarian personality’.  The mode of organizing (that is, the 
means) would here reside in favor of individuals’ intentions, biography, and personal-
ity, or at least the conditions that enabled a specific personality type to flourish and be 
rewarded. Adorno’s account would imply a more socio-psychological perspective. It 
would stress the specificity, the uniqueness, the abnormality of those who perpetrated 
the Holocaust; however, as scholars such as Bauman and Higgins make clear, it is its 
very mundane, organizationally routine qualities, the normalcy of its technical rational-
ity, which is most compelling about the Holocaust. The organizational apparatus de-
fined the identities not just of its victims but also its perpetrators, just as Goffman 
(1961) would lead us to think. 
In total institutions in extremis, such as the death camps, whether we like it or 
not, we see the techniques of everyday organizational power in sharp relief and focus, 
as earlier generations of organizational behaviorists realized (Milgram 1974). The 
techniques of total institutional power are assuredly organizational techniques, not 
techniques of caprice, will or individual voluntarism. Moreover, these techniques are 
deliberate acts of domination. By this we refer not to the violence but to the ordering, 
the social organization of ethical horror, in such a way that damage is domesticated, 
tamed, made normal. If such horrors and monstrosities can be tamed, how much eas-
ier is it to enact the many lesser calumnies and sins of everyday power in ordinary or-
ganizational life?    
Where damage has been done, in extremis, as in the Holocaust, it seems to have 
largely slipped attention. The Holocaust, rightly, is claimed to occupy a special case in 
the annals of twentieth century history. While organizational form, in conjunction 
with an overemphasis on instrumental rationality, helps distance human suffering, it is 
not a sufficient condition for terror, nor is it even necessary in certain circumstances.  
Excesses of instrumental rationality (organizing) and disregard for substantial rational-
ity (human rights) can lead to barbarism.  But the opposite also holds.  Disorganiza-
tion and chaos, or a lack of instrumental rationality and over-concern with substantive 
rationality, such as are furnished by racism and fundamentalism, can provoke similarly 
disastrous consequences, as Rwanda demonstrates.
The Holocaust is the crime of the last century, largely because it was not some 
gruesome means to some other end but was an end in itself. Six million people were 
annihilated; national histories irrevocably marked, and generations sundered through 
rational organization in the space of less than six years. Nothing else compares with its 
atrocities. Nonetheless, although the atrocity of the Holocaust was unique, its organ-
izational form as a total institution was not. While industrially organized genocide may 
                                                                                                                               
tutions, but in the midst of their villages, by a brutalized mob, often using just machetes 
or bare hands.  The uniqueness of the Holocaust is that it was organized and industrial-
ized mass-murder, not pure hate, hysteria, or collective ethnic vengeance and ‘cleansing’. 
Its organizational basis is what makes it unique. 
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not have recurred since the Nazi’s death camps, despite the many atrocities that have 
occurred globally in the intervening sixty years, the total institutional form did not die 
out with the Nazi’s. Here is not the place to tell of more contemporary horrors but 
should the reader need instruction, if current affairs (not focused on gossip and celeb-
rity) does not suffice, then they can consult Clegg et al (2006), from which this ac-
count is, in part, drawn. 
Power is a relation between human beings, who are, in theory, free to act by being 
in the world and projecting this being onto the world, which entails acting in concert 
with others if they are to be effective. Destroy the possibility of concerted action and the capacity 
to resist diminishes and domination fills the near horizon. Organization at its most liberal is car-
ried out with regard for persons; when that adage is turned against particular categories 
of person for whom ill-regard is only too evident, legal instrumental rationality makes it 
easier for some people to do horrific things to make other people do things which they 
might not otherwise do through the practice of rigid adherence to rules. When organiza-
tion members apply a rule they cannot do so blindly, unaware of the consequences. 
When such judgments are made, where rigid adherence to a legal instrumental rationality 
is fused with a total organizational apparatus, we have a fearsome instrument. A total in-
stitution is not merely a material apparatus; it is a value apparatus constructed around 
too high a regard for legal instrumental rationality and too little regard for the social real-
ity of ethics in practice as a care not only for the self but also the other.   
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